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CASE BRIEFS

DISCOVERY
Discovery of Documents Regarding "Available Resources" for
Immediate Relief Limited to State's Mental Health Budget
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
limited the discovery of documents regarding a state's "available
resources" to state's mental health budget.'
Plaintiffs, several disabled developmentally Illinois adults,
brought suit against Defendants, Illinois State officials, in their official
capacity, for alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and violation of the federal
Medicaid statute.2 The RA and the ADA require disabled persons
protected under the acts to obtain state services in the most integrated
setting possible. Plaintiffs, however, argued that Defendants' refusal
to provide additional Intermediate Care Facilities for the
Developmentally Disabled (ICFDD) in the Chicagoland area was an
attempt to isolate them in Southern Illinois!
The district court
dismissed Plaintiffs' claim, -and Plaintiffs appealed three counts of the
complaint that dealt with the RA, the ADA and the federal Medicaid
statute. 5
The Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of Plaintiffs' count
alleging violation of the federal Medicaid statute, but remanded the
remaining counts to the district court for consideration as to whether
the State of Illinois did, in fact, intend to isolate the developmentally
disabled adults in Southern Illinois.6 In exploring the issue presented,
plaintiffs served defendants with a request for production of any and all
documents related to the state's efforts to obtain federal funding, as
well documentation on state programs not receiving federal Medicaid
'Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, No. 00 C 5392, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 276, at *12 (N.D.
11. 2004).
2
Id. at *2.
3
1d at *2,7.
4
1d. at *3-4.
5Id. at *3.
6
Bruggeman,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 276 at *24.
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reimbursement.7 Defendants objected to certain requests and failed to
comply with the remaining requests.8 Plaintiffs responded by filing a
motion to compel certain documents.9
In addressing Plaintiffs' motion to compel, the court held the
scope of a state's "available resources" for accommodating
developmentally disabled adults' immediate relief is limited to the
state's mental health budget.' ° Therefore, Plaintiffs were not entitled to
documents regarding Medicaid funding unless such funding was
included in the state's mental health budget." Any proposed funding or
failure to obtain funding would be unavailable to grant immediate12
relief, so any documents related to such would also be irrelevant.
Plaintiff's motion to compel was denied, except for proposed budgets
that show efforts by Defendants to gain matching funding from the
federal government, and documents that showed the Illinois Medicaid
Plan and/or Medicaid Waiver Plan is not in compliance with the ADA
or RA. 3 Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, No. 00 C 5392, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 276 (N.D. 111.2004).
LABOR RELATIONS
Physician Suing Hospital for Employment Discrimination
Must Establish Employer-Employee Relationship
Under the Common Law Agency Test
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
summary judgment favoring the hospital, because the surgeon who
brought the employment discrimination claim failed to establish an
14
employer-employee relationship between himself and the hospital.
The Defendant-surgeon performed thyroid resection surgery on a
woman at Deaconess Hospital.' 5 Prior to this surgery, the Defendant
had enjoyed privileges at Deaconess for over 20 years.'6 Although the
patient's condition deteriorated in the days following the surgery;
however, the Defendant did not return to the hospital to evaluate the

'Id. at *6.
'Id at *4.
9
1d
"Id at *12.
"Bruggeman, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 276 at *14-16.
"Id.at *14.
"Id.
at *19-20.
4
1 Shah v. Deaconess Hospital, No. 02-3033,2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
428 (6th Cir. 2004).
151d.
6
' 1d

20041
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patient's status until she went into cardiac arrest. 7 By the time the
Defendant arrived at Sthe18hospital, the patient had already been intubated
and put on a respirator. Despite the Defendant's attempt to surgically
drain the patient's neck at that time, the patient's condition continued to
deteriorate, and she died two weeks later.19 Upon peer review, the
Defendant was found to have seriously misjudged the management of
the deceased patient.20 His privileges allowing him to perform head and
neck surgery were
•21 revoked, and a one-year period of monitoring and
review was imposed.
Following revocation of his privileges, the Defendant sued the
hospital in federal district court alleging age discrimination under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), discrimination based
on natural origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
discrimination in violation of Ohio law (Ohio. Rev. Code Ann.
§4112.02(A)). 22 The district court granted the hospital's summary
judgment motion, finding that the surgeon failed to make a prima facie
case as he did not prove "that he was qualified to perform head and
neck surgeries., 23 In addition, the court reasoned that the surgeon had
not refuted the hospital's non-discriminatory justification for revoking
the Defendant's privileges.24
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's
finding using a de novo standard of review and emphasized its right to
affirm on any grounds supported by the record.25 The court noted that
federal employment discrimination statutes apply to employees, but not
independent contractors.2 Accordingly, the first issue addressed was
whether the surgeon's relationship with Deaconess was that of an
employee or independent' contractor. 27 To determine whether the
surgeon was an employee, the court applied the common law agency
test and evaluated multiple factors. 8
Review of the agency test factors revealed that the hospital did not
pay the surgeon or treat him as an employee for tax purposes. 21
Moreover, the surgeon conducted 45% of his surgeries elsewhere, the
7

Id at *3.

"9 Shah, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 428 at *34.
Id at *4.
21/d
"2Id

"3Id at *5.
24
2 Shah, 2004

Id at *5-6.

2
"Id at
21Id at

*7.
*6.
"Id. at *9-10.
29Id at * 12.

U.S. App. LEXIS 428 at *5.
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hospital was not entitled to control or interfere with his work or
schedule, and he was not obligated to accept patients referred by
Deaconess.3 ° Based upon its application of the agency test, the court
determined that the hospital and the surgeon were not engaged in an
employer-employee relationship."
The court affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Deaconess, holding that
the ADEA, Title VII, and Ohio. Rev. Code Ann. §4112.02(A) did not
protect the relationship between the surgeon and the hospital.32 Shah v.
Deaconess Hospital,No. 02-3033, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 428 (6th Cir.
2004).
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Physician Authorized to Perform Surgery is Operating Surgeon
Regardless of the Degree to Which Resident Physician Participates
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the Circuit Court of Peoria
County's denial of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment alleging
medical battery and grant of defendant's motions to dismiss counts
of
33
fraud and summary judgment on alleged counts of medical battery.
Plaintiff went to see Dr. Anderson and was admitted to the
hospital for a possible surgery after experiencing recurrent abdominal
pain."
Plaintiff signed a "Consent to Surgery/Procedure" form,
authorizing Dr. Anderson, his assistants and his associates to perform
diagnostic laparoscopy, possible laparoscopic appendectomy, and
possible open appendectomy. 35
Dr. Anderson and a chief resident conducted the laparoscopic
appendectomy. 36 Dr. Anderson supervised and directed the entire
procedure.37 Although the chief resident was listed as an assistant, he
performed a significant part of the operation."
After sustaining a leak in his small bowel following the
laparoscopic appendectomy, the Plaintiff brought this medical
malpractice action.39 Plaintiff brought the action against Dr. Anderson,
3

Shah, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 428 at *10-12.
"Id. at *12.
3"Id at * 13.
3"Matthew Lane v. Richard Anderson, No. 3-03-0030, 2004 Ii. App. LEXIS 3 (Il1. App.
Ct. 2003).
34 d. at 259.
35Id

"Id. at *4,5.
"Lane, 2004 I1. App. LEXIS 3, at *4.
"Id. at 5.
39d at *2.
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the attending physician, the chief resident, and the OSF Healthcare
System, the chief resident's employer.4 ° On appeal, the court addressed
the following issues: (1) the trial court's denial of Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment on count III, which alleged medical battery by the
resident; (2) the granting of summary judgment in favor of the resident
and OSF Healthcare System on counts III and IV, which alleged
medical battery; (3) the denial of Plaintiff's motion to amend his
complaint to a claim for medical battery against Dr. Anderson; and (4)
the dismissal of Plaintiff's counts of alleged fraud against the resident
and OSF.41
The Illinois Appellate Court held that denial of Plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment as to count III, alleging medical battery against
the resident, was not appealable as a matter of law. 4' The court
affirmed the summary judgment favoring the resident and OSF on the
medical battery counts because the facts did not show that the treatment
given to the Plaintiff was at substantial variance with the consent
granted.43 The consent form Plaintiff signed authorized "Dr. Anderson
and such assistants and associates to be selected by him/her to perform
the procedure." 44 As the form stated, Dr. Anderson had been the
primary surgeon and was responsible for the Plaintiff during the entire
operation. 45 He guided the resident and made all the decisions and
necessary judgments. 46 Thus, the court concluded that Dr. Anderson
was the primary surgeon, regardless of the degree to which the resident
had participated.47
The court also found that count VI, alleging fraud by Dr.
Anderson, had been properly dismissed.48 Plaintiff alleged that Dr.
Anderson committed fraud when he represented to Plaintiff that he
would be performing the operation when he knew that the resident had
the option of acting as the operating surgeon. 41 Plaintiff further alleged
Dr. Anderson later concealed that the resident had performed the
surgery and he had only assisted.0 The court, however, found that the
facts showed the plaintiff had executed a broad consent form
authorizing Dr. Anderson to select "such associates and assistants" and
4
1d. at
4
4 2Id. at

*2.
*2-3.
Lane, 2004 Il1.App. Lexis 3, at *6-7.
43
Id at *8.
"Id.
45
46 1d. at
1d

*9.

47
App.
48Lane,2004 I11.
Id at *15-16.
9
4

1d. at *13.

50

d

Lexis 3, at *9.
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Dr. Anderson was the operating surgeon regardless of the degree to
which the resident participated in the operation.' In addition, because
the count of fraud against Dr. Anderson had been properly dismissed,
and the resident and OSF were only liable for fraud committed by Dr.
Anderson, counts VII and VIII alleging fraud against the resident and
OSF were also properly dismissed.52 Matthew Lane v. Richard
Anderson, No. 3-03-0030,2004111. App. LEXIS 3 (111 App. Ct. 2003).
MICRA Cap on Noneconomic Damages Extends Not Only to
Health Care Providers But to Vicariously Liable Employers of
Negligent Health Professionals
The Appellate Court of California found that medical groups are not
persons licensed to practice medicine under the California Business &
Professional Code.53 The court reversed the trial court's decision and
found that the medical group was vicariously liable for the negligent
acts of the physician, and thus, subject to the $250,000 cap on
noneconomic damages set by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act (MICRA).54
In March 1988, three physicians from Bay Shore Medical Group
treated plaintiff, Terry Lathrop, after she discovered a lump in her
breast.5 5 However, none of the physicians from the group ordered a
diagnostic mammogram.56 During this time Bay Shore Medical Group
merged with HealthCare Partners Medical Group. 7 In August 1998,
plaintiff moved and was seen by a new physician who ordered a
mammogram.5 ' Dr. Lanflisi, a surgeon, evaluated the mammogram and
concluded a biopsy was not needed. 59 A year later, plaintiff discovered
a new lump, which was determined by a biopsy to be cancerous.60
Expert witnesses found that her life expectancy would be no more than
eight years after a mastectomy.61
Plaintiff sued for medical
malpractice, and the jury awarded plaintiff $403,055 in economic
damages and $2.1 million in non-economic damages.62 The jury found
'Lane, 2004 Ill. App. Lexis 3. at *15.
"Id.at *16.
"Terry Lathrop v. HealthCare Partners Medical Group, Nos. A098487, A098897, 2004
Cal. App. LEXIS 69 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., 2004).
541d.

55Id
6
1

Id. at *3.

57Id.
8

Lathrop,2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 69, at *3.

"Id.

"Id at *4.
62Id.
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HealthCare Partners 58% liable, Diagnostic Imaging 35% liable, Dr.
Lanflisi 5% liable, and others 2% liable.63

The first issue before the court was whether HealthCare Partners
qualify as a health care provider under MICRA. 64 The MICRA
limitation on damages applies to two categories of health care
providers: licensed practitioners and licensed facilities.65 The court's
analysis was limited to whether HealthCare Partners qualified as a
licensed practitioner. The court examined the statutory language and
found that the definition of health care provider extends only to a
person licensed under the Business and Professions Code. 67 The
Business and Professions Code explicitly states that only natural
persons may be licensed to practice medicine. 68 The court concluded
that since only natural persons are intended to be licensed to practice
medicine, and HealthCare Partners is not a natural person, it does not
qualify as a health care provider.69
Next, the court examined the issue of whether the MICRA cap
should be applied to HealthCare Providers under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. 0 Under respondeat superior, an employer is
vicariously liable for the acts of its agents or employees done within the
course of employment.' Here, HealthCare Providers was the employer
of the three physicians plaintiff visited who failed to order a diagnostic
mammogram. 2 HealthCare Partners liability was solely vicarious,
being based only upon the negligence of its physicians." If an
employer is vicariously liable, any substantive defense that is available
to the employee is also available to the employer.74 The court thus
concluded that the liability of HealthCare Partners, as an employer, is
limited to the liability of its employees or physicians.5 Therefore,
since the employees of HealthCare Partners could not be held liable for
non-economic damages in excess of $250,000, neither could
HealthCare Partners. 76 The court, however, noted that exempting
vicariously liable defendants from the $250,000 cap would be contrary
63

Lathrop,2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 69, at *4.

m
664
5 d. at

*8.

Id at *9.

66d. at *10.
671d

6'Lathrop,
2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 69, at *11.
691d.

at *11-13.

7°Id.
at
7
Id. at
72

*14.
*15.
1d. at *2-3.

"Lathrop,
2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 69, at * 16.
74
Id. at * 19.
75
1d. at * 19.
76
1d.
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to the legislative intent of replacing unpredictable jury awards. 7' To
avoid the MICRA cap, a plaintiff would only need to sue the employer
or principal employing the negligent physician."
Lathrop v.
HealthCare Partners Medical Group, Nos. A098487, A098897, 2004
Cal.App. LEXIS 69 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2004).
MENTAL HEALTH
Pharmaceutical Records Are Mental Health Records Protected
From Disclosure Pursuant to the Confidentiality Act
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division,
concluded that pharmaceutical records are among the
79 records protected
from disclosure pursuant to the Confidentiality Act.

On May 29, 2002, Jennifer Farrell-Peters (Petitioner-Appellant)
filed a motion to quash three subpoenas issued by Thomas PetersFarrell (Respondent-Appellee) to three drug stores to produce
Petitioner-Appellant's prescription drug records. ° The circuit court
denied Petitioner-Appellant's motion, but certified the question as to
whether such records would be protected under the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act"
Petitioner-Appellant argued her pharmaceutical records were
mental health records under the Confidentiality Act, and therefore,
were protected from disclosure. 2 Respondent-Appellee responded that
pharmacists and their records are not protected under the Act, as the
Act does not include pharmacists in its definition of therapists. 3
The court concluded the term "record" under the Act included
any record kept by a therapist or an "agency in the course of providing
mental health ... services," and that the term "services"

included

pharmaceuticals. s4

The court further held that a pharmacy constituted
an "agency" within the meaning of the Act, and that pharmaceutical
records relating to mental health services were protected. 5
Because the language of the Confidentiality Act defining "record"
was ambiguous, the court looked to the purpose of the statute to
"Id at *27.
7
Lathrop,2004 Cal. App. LEXIS 69, at *28.
"In re Marriage of Peters-Farrell, No. 1-02-2140, 2003 Ill. App. LEXIS 1586 at * 13 (I11.
App., Dec. 31, 2003).
°Id at *2.
81Id
"Id
"Id. at *4-5.
"Peters-Farre, 2003 I11.App. LEXIS 1586 at *6.
"Id. at *8.
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construe its meaning."' By analyzing. the Act as a whole, the court
determined the state was carefully drawn to restrict disclosure unless
explicitly provided."
Therefore, anyone seeking release of mental
health records must prove it is authorized under the Confidentiality
Act." In re Marriage of Peters-Farrell,No. 1-02-2140, 2003 Ill. App.
LEXIS 1586 (ll. App. Ct. 2003).
NEGLIGENCE
California Hospitals Do Not Owe a Direct Duty
To Decedents' Survivors in Disposing of the Remains
The California Court of Appeals, Third District, held that the Hospital
did not deprive Plaintiff of a property interest in her mother's remains,
and the Hospital did not owe the Plaintiff a duty of care when they
transferred the remains to the County Coroner for cremation, in
accordance with California Health and Safety Code provisions,
following moderate efforts to get in touch with the Plaintiff regarding
the disposition of the remains.8 9
Decedent was admitted to the Hospital on November 11, 1999. 90
Plaintiff's final visit to see the decedent was on November 16, 2000, at
which time the Plaintiff provided one of the decedent's nurses with
Plaintiff's current address and phone number. 9' On August 5, 2000,
Plaintiff's mother (decedent) passed away.92 Upon the decedent's
death, a nurse called the number listed in the decedent's chart to inform
the Plaintiff; however, the number within the chart corresponded to the
Plaintiff's old address and was not the most recent number provided by
the Plaintiff.93 The nurse also contacted the decedent's former nursing
home in order to attain the Plaintiffs correct contact information.94
However, the telephone number provided by the home had been
disconnected.95 After all attempts to contact the Plaintiff failed, the
decedent's remains were sent to the County Coroner. 9 On August 17,
86

Id
7

88Id. at

*9.

1d.

89
Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Assoc., No. C043762, 114 Cal. App. 4th 208 at *212, 220,
222 (Cal. App. December 11, 2003).
90
1d. at *212.
91Id

92Id at *211.
931d
4

9 Spates, 114 Cal. App. 4th 208 at *212.
95Id
96Id

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

Vol. 7.2:315

2000, the Plaintiff attempted to contact the decedent and learned of her
death.97

Plaintiff filed a cause of action against the Hospital, claiming that
regards to disposal of the decedent's
the Hospital owed her a duty -in
remains, and seeking damages for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.98 The Hospital, in turn, filed a motion for summary
judgment. 99 The trial court granted the motion finding there was a not a
preexisting relationship between the parties, and that the Hospital had
made adequate efforts to locate Plaintiff upon decedent's death."°°
Operating under the theory of a direct victim claim, the court
explained that liability may be based upon a duty if it met one of three
requirements, including: (1) the duty had been assumed by the
Hospital; (2) imposed by law; or (3) derived from a relationship
between the Plaintiff and the Hospital.'0 ' The court concluded there
was not a preexisting relationship between the parties as the Plaintiff's
mere provision of contact information did not suffice in creating such a
relationship. 0 2 Accordingly, the court also concluded that the Hospital
owed a duty of care to the decedent, which expired upon decedent's
death, and no duty was owed to the Plaintiff directly.0 3 Plaintiff argued
that the Hospital's duty could be derived from Section 7104 of the
Health and Safety Code, and required that the Hospital use reasonable
efforts to locate a decedent's relatives before giving the remains to the
coroner.'0n Plaintiff also argued Dameron assumed a duty to notify her,
but Plaintiff failed to provide an adequate argument or any legal
support.0 5 The court, however, determined the statute was designed to
protect the county treasury from the responsibility of disposal of
decedents' remains, where next of kin could be located.'o6
07
The court then addressed Plaintiff's claim for conversion.
The elements of conversion, the court explained, included: (1) "the
plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property at the time
of the conversion; (2) the defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or
disposition of the property rights; and (3) damages."'' 8 Based on the
facts of the case, the court concluded that the Hospital had not taken
971d

98Md

"Spates, 114 Cal. App. 4" 208 at *212.
...
Id at *213-14.
"°2Spates, 114 Cal. App. 4 h 208 at *215.
Id at *216.
'%d
at *216-17.
5
Id.at *220.
' Id. at *219-220.
"'Spates, 114 Cal. App. 4th 208 at *220.
"'Id at *221.
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affirmative action to exercise the requisite control or dominion over the
decedent's remains, the Hospital had not asserted ownership, or
prevented the Plaintiff's exercise of her rights over the remains.' °9
Rather, the court found that the Hospital had made an adequate attempt
to locate the Plaintiff, and provided the Coroner with the remains in
compliance with section 7104 as it was unable to locate the Plaintiff.1 °
The court affirmed the trial court's grant of Dameron's motion for
summary judgment."' Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Assoc., No. C043762,
114 Cal.App. 4th 208 (Cal.App. December 11, 2003).
PRIVACY
Court Rules Physicians in Medical Office May Share Confidential
Patient Information
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that communication
between physicians who work in a medical enterprise together, where
both parties are under a mutual obligation of confidentiality, does not
constitute unconsented, unprivileged communication with a third party,
and therefore, was not a breach of the confidential physician-patient
relationship.'
Dr. Caceres was treating his patient, Ernest Suesbury, for HIV." 3
Suesbury received treatment on an unrelated matter from Dr. Alfred
Muller, who was another physician in the office."14 Suesbury disclosed
his HIV status to Muller." 5 Suesbury alleged that Muller sexually
molested him during this visit."6 Suesbury subsequently phoned
Caceres and wrote a letter outlining his allegations."7
Caceres
promised to investigate the matter, and in a memo to Muller, discussed
the charge and mentioned Suesbury's HIV status." 8 When Suesbury
later obtained a copy of the letter, he sued the practice on allegations of
breach of the confidential physician-patient relationship and intentional

...
/d.at *222.
0
1'11d'
1Id.
"2Suesbury v. Caceres, M.D. et. al., No. 01-CV-1456, 2004 D.C. App. LEXIS 9, at *17
(D.C. 2004).
"'Idat *1.
1141d

''5Id.
"'Id.at *1, 2.
'"Suesbuy, 2004 D.C. App. LEXIS 9, at *3.
118Id

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

infliction of emotion distress."1 9

Vol. 7.2:315

The trial court granted summary

judgment for the defendant, and Suesbury challenged the judgment. 20
On appeal, the court explained that to show a breach of
confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship, plaintiff must show
an unconsented, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic
information that the defendant learned within a confidential
relationship. 12' The question was whether the disclosure of Suesbury's
HIV status was an uncontested, unprivileged disclosure to a third
party.122 In laying out its analysis the court acknowledged that it was
unable to cite any case addressing the issue of communications
between two physicians in the same office.2 2 The court referenced the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA). 124 HIPAA was enacted after oral arguments, but prior to the
disposition of the appeal. 125 Under HIPAA, a medical office may
disclose protected health information -in the context of treatment,
payment and health care operations."' In addition, the court recognized
a similar privilege that exists among attorneys in a law firm and also27
cited the District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct.
Finally, the court analogized the issue to testimonial privilege that
exists when a physician may not testify against a patient without the
patient's consent. 21 8 While noting the differences between testimonial
privilege and confidential communications, the court found the
comparison useful to explain the extent of confidential
communications. 129
Despite the fact the communication in the instant case did not arise
from a current medical condition, the court determined physicians in
the same medical group should be able to communicate in the course of
treatment and office administration. 30 The court also mentioned that
both physicians already knew the patient's HIV status. 3' The court
reasoned that analyzing communications on a sentence-by-sentence
basis would dampen professional exchange.3 2 In any event, the court
..
1d.at *4.
'2 Id. at *5.
...
1d.at *5, 6.
2004 D.C. App. LEXIS 9, at *6.
...Suesbury,
23
' 1d at *7.
'225 1d. at *6.
1 Id.
1261d

27
Suesbury, 2004 D.C. App. LEXIS 9, at *11.
'2 Id. at *12, 13.
Id. at *13.
130ld.

13'Id. at "14.
"'Suesbury, 2004 D.C. App. LEXIS 9, at *14.
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said there is no doubt the "cloak of confidentiality" encompasses both
physicians.'33 Consequently, there was no claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress or breach of confidential physicianpatient communications. 3 4 Suesbury v. Caceres, MD. et. al., No. 01CV-1456, 2004 D.C. App. LEXIS 9 (D.C 2004).
PRIVILEGE
The State Must Establish an "Essential Need" to Abrogate
the
Physician - Patient Privilege for Purposes of Criminal
Prosecution
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire vacated three separate rulings
by the trial court and granted the State access to privileged medical
records, after finding that the State had failed to establish "essential
need" for disclosure in order to establish its cases.'35
Defendants Carta, Barker, and Payne were all involved in motor
vehicle accidents, and the State alleged they were intoxicated at the
time of their accidents. 3 6 Police officers observed each of the
Defendants following their respective accidents, at the scene and at St.
Joseph's Hospital (Hospital). 37. The grand jury issued a subpoena to
the Hospital allowing it to procure the Defendants' medical records so
the State could establish the "serious bodily injury" element of the
Defendants' alleged crimes. 3 ' Otherwise, the court reasoned, the State
would be unable to adequately assess whether Defendants had
sustained "serious bodily injury," and alternative sources for the
information were unavailable.'39 Defendants and the Hospital appealed
the trial court's rulings.
The court began its analysis by providing the three circumstances
under which disclosure of privileged records is appropriate: (1) when
disclosure is authorized by statute; (2) when "a sufficiently compelling
countervailing consideration is identified"; and (3) when the facts of
the case make disclosure essential.'4 ° The State provided two
"'Id.at *15.
"'Id.at *17.
..Inre Grand Jury Subpoena for Medical Records of Curtis Payne; In re Grand Jury
Subpoena for Medical Records of Scott Carta; New Hampshire v. Gregory Barka, Nos. 2002384, 2002-390, 2002-643, 2004 N.H. LEXIS 1 (N.H., January 6, 2004).
36Id at *2.
137id
13siad.

" Id at *3.
"Payne, 2004 N.H. LEXIS 1 at *7-8.
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arguments in support of disclosure of the medical records.' 4 ' First, the
State argued RSA 631:6 required the Hospital to act upon the
subpoena, as the Hospital had failed to comply with the RSA
requirement which mandated that providers report to law enforcement
officials upon treating injuries they believe to be associated with
criminal activity.4 2 The court, however, determined that the statute was
unilateral authority for the State to subpoena
not intended to create
43
privileged records. 1
Under its second argument, the State asserted that disclosure
would be essential for it to properly pursue and prove the "serious
bodily injury" element of its case. 44 The court delineated the two
elements necessary to prove "essential need": (1) proof that the
information cannot be obtained elsewhere; and (2) a compelling
justification for the disclosure. 145 The court conceded that investigation
of crimes constituted a compelling justification for disclosure. 41 In
evaluating whether the State had a reasonable alternative source to
establish its case, the court examined whether there was admissible
alternative evidence, whether the alternative evidence is sufficient to
withstand a motion for directed verdict, and whether the State had
147
made reasonable investigative efforts to obtain alternative evidence.
The court stated, "the trial court must make explicit findings and
rulings on each dispositive prong ... 1
In the Carta case, the court remanded to the trial court for a
determination concerning whether the State had evidence capable of
surviving a motion for directed verdict, and whether the State had made
adequate investigative efforts. 49 The Payne case was remanded back to
the trial court for evaluation of whether the State made proper efforts to
locate alternative sources of evidence.'5 ° The court also remanded
Barka for resolution of issues regarding admissibility of alternative
evidence obtained by the State, and the sufficiency of the State's
investigative efforts.' 5 ' The court went on to state that any subpoena
served upon a provider must also be issued to the defendant.'5 2 Upon
objection to production of the records, an in camera inspection of the
'",dat *8.
*8-9.
141d at *10.

1411d. at

14 'Payne, 2004 N.H. LEXIS 1 at *11.
4'Id at *16.
"'Idat *18.
"5 Payne, 2004 N.H. LEXIS I at *20.
'Id. at *22-23.
"'Id.at *24.
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records shall be required, and only that information deemed necessary
to establish "serious bodily injury" should be disclosed.'53 In re Grand
Jury Subpoena for Medical Records of Curtis Payne, In re GrandJury
Subpoena for Medical Records of Scott Carta; New Hampshire v.
Gregory Barka, Nos. 2002-384, 2002-390, 2002-643, 2004 N.H.
LEXIS 1 (N.H, January6,2004).
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Admission Into Evidence of Physician's Records, Compiled By
State Professional Conduct Board, Did Not Violate Physician's
Confidentiality
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third
Department confirmed the Administrative Law Judge's5 4admission of
physician's state professional conduct file into evidence.'
In June 2000, Petitioner physician contacted the Medical Society
of the State of New York's Committee for Physician's Health (CPH) to
inform them about her current addiction to Xanax, her posttraumatic
stress disorder and suicidal thoughts.'55 She was referred to a treatment
center, but left three days later. ' Pursuant to state law, CPH reported
petitioner to the State Board for Professional Conduct.'5 7 Upon
investigation, the Office of Professional Medical Conduct concluded
that petitioner habitually used narcotics and had a psychiatric condition
that impaired her ability to practice medicine. 8 Petitioner was
formally charged, and a Hearing Committee sustained the alleged
misconduct, placed her on five years probation, and required her to
submit to random drug and alcohol testing and therapy.' 9
Petitioner challenged the determination, pursuant to CLPR Article
78, and alleged inter alia it was error for the Administrative Law Judge
to have admitted into evidence the file compiled by CPH.'6 ° Petitioner
supported her claim by citing Public Health Law § 230(11)(a), which
requires the Medical Society of the State of New York to report to the
State Board for Professional Misconduct any suspected physician
misconduct and further provides that the reports remain confidential
"'Id at *24-25.
14Rowley v. New York State Dep't of Health, No. 92741, 2004
N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS
131 (N.Y. App. Div., January 8, 2004).

15'Id at *1.

"'Id at * 1, 2.

"'Id
at *2.
158ird
"'Rowley, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 131 at *2.
60id
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and not be admitted into evidence in any administrative or judicial
,. 161
proceeding.
The court held that the purpose of the confidentiality provisions
contained in Public Health Law § 230 was to encourage the reporting
of suspected physician misconduct by reducing the fear of disclosure,
thus ensuring appropriate investigation.162 The court construed the
statute broadly to avoid shielding offending physicians from
appropriate disciplinary measures.16 Rowley v. New York State Dep't
of Health, No. 92741, 2004 N.Y App. Div. LEXIS 131 (N.Y App.
Div., January8, 2004).
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
A Fetus Is Not a Person Requiring Appointment of a Guardian
The Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, found that the trial court
had the authority and correctly refused to appoint a guardian to the
fetus of a ward of the state.' 64
The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a
petition seeking emergency adult protective services for a ward, J.D.S.,
who was pregnant as a result of sexual battery that occurred in a group
home. 65 The petition requested appointment ofa guardian for J.D.S. as
well as protective supervision. 166 The petition was later amended to
include a separate guardian for the fetus.1 67 DCFS reported that J.D.S.
was totally mentally incapacitated, and that her guardian would have
interests adverse to the fetus.1 68 Specifically, the person who sought
guardianship for the fetus alleged its necessity because J.D.S. lacked
capacity to provide necessary prenatal care and decisions to protect the
fetus.169

The court denied the petition on several grounds.70 The potential
fetal guardian was denied a rehearing.17 1 She then filed a notice of
In the meantime, the guardian of J.D.S. determined an
appeal. 17
161Id
162md

at *3.

"'Id.at *4.
" Wixtrom v. Dept. of Children and Families, No. 5D03-1921, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS
161 (Fla. App. 5 Dist., January 9, 2004).
"'Id.at *3.
166id.
1671d.
168Id
169Wixtrom,

'0Id. at *5.
"'Id.
at *6.
1721d].

2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 161, at *4.
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abortion would not be performed.'73 J.D.S. delivered the child and the
appellate court decided 17to4 hear the case based on its merits and its

importance to the public.

The appellate court cited three reasons to uphold the trial court's
decision.' First, the statutory section governing guardianship does not
provide for, the appointment of a guardian for a fetus.'76 , The court
stated that the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning, and
177
that the legislature would have provided such a right if it existed.
This was said to be the case since in other contexts, a fetus is explicitly78
entitled to protection, such as the case for vehicular homicide.
Second, a guardian is statutorily defined as a person appointed to act on
behalf of a ward's person or property or both. 17 A ward is defined as a
person for whom a guardian has been appointed.'8 ° Thus, to be
considered a ward, a fetus must be regarded as a person, and no Florida
statute or case has made such a determination. 8 ' Finally, to address
concerns the guardian might authorize an abortion, the court laid out
the numerous statutory steps required before a guardian of a mother and
fetus could consent to a medical procedure."2

Having addressed the state statute as it pertained to the case, the
court determined the trial court correctly denied the petition to appoint
a guardian for the fetus of J.D.S.'83
Wixtrom v. Dept. of Children andFamilies,No. 5D03-1921, 2004 Fla.
App. LEXIS 161 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App., January9, 2004).
Court Declared New Hampshire's Parental Notification Prior to
Abortion Act Unconstitutional and Granted a Permanent Injunction
to Prevent Enforcement of the Act
The United States District Court for New Hampshire held that the New
Hampshire's Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act (Act) was
unconstitutional and declared a permanent injunction against

1731d

174Wixtrom, 2004

Fla. App. LEXIS 161, at *7.

"'Id.at *8-13.
176Id at *8.
'"Id at *9.
78

179 d.
1 Wixtrom,

2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 161, at *10.
1d at *10.
1
"' d. at *10, 11.
82
1d. at *12, 13.
113Id. at *14.
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enforcement because the Act failed to provide for a constitutionally

required exception to protect the pregnant minor's health. 114
The New Hampshire Legislature passed an Act in June 2003
requiring parental notification before abortions could be performed on
"unemancipated minors." 81 5 The Act stated that minors must notify
parents prior to seeking abortions or seek a court hearing to determine
whether the "'pregnant minor is mature and capable of giving informed
consent to the proposed abortion or 'whether the performance of an
abortion upon her without notification of her parent, guardian, or
conservator would be in her best interests.' ,186 The only exception to
the Act is if a physician determines that the abortion is necessary to
prevent the minor's death and there is not time to satisfy the notice
requirement.'87 The Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, in
conjunction with Dr. Wayne Goldner, brought a civil rights action
under section 1983 to have the act declared unconstitutional,
and to
88
impose an injunction to prevent its enforcement.1
The issues before the court were: (1) whether the Act was
unconstitutional because it lacked an exception to the parental notice
requirement in circumstances to protect the pregnant mother's health;
(2) whether the death exception in the Act violated physicians' due
process rights and is unconstitutionally narrow; and (3) whether the
court should grant an injunction to prevent enforcement of the Act89
The

court

determined

that it was

necessary

to evaluate

the

constitutionality of the Act according to the Casey decision.' 90 Under
Casey, an Act will be found unconstitutional if it imposes "'an undue
burden' or 'will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice
to undergo an abortion."" 9' The court further stated that according to
Casey and Stenberg a health exception is necessary in any statute that
limiting a woman's right to have an abortion.'92
The court stated that although the Act included an exception to the
notification requirement when an abortion is necessary to prevent the
death of a minor, the Act failed to comply with the constitutional
requirement- of providing a health exception that does not result in
...
Planned Parenthood of Northern New England v. Peter Heed, No. CIV. 03-491-JD,
2003 WL 23025210 at *1 (N.H. Dec. 29, 2003).
1851d.at *1.
'..
d at *1.
.71d.at *1.
88

1

d.

89

lannedParenthood ofNorthern NewEngland,2003 WL 23025210 at *1-8.
'90Id. at *2, citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874,
877 & 895, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed.2d 674 (1992).
19 id.at *2.
1121d.

743 (2000).

at *2, 4, citingStenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S.914, 921, 120 S.Ct. 2587, 147 L.Ed.2d
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death.'93 No other New Hampshire statutes or judicial bypasses
provided the required health exception that would result in the
constitutionality of the Act. 94 Thus, the court found the death
exception to be unconstitutionally narrow and held that even if the
statute could be construed to include an implied requirement "that
physicians who make a good faith, objectively reasonable effort to
comply with the Act would not be subject to prosecution. "' 95 The court
found it was still unreasonable and had already held unconstitutional by
the

Sixth

Circuit.' 96

The

court decided

not

to rule on

the

constitutionality of the confidentiality provision concerning the judicial
bypass procedure since it ruled the Act to be unconstitutional. 9 7 The
court further determined that severing parts of the Act would still not
result in a constitutional Act despite contentions from the attorney
general otherwise.'98
To determine if a permanent injunction was necessary, the court
looked to whether the plaintiff had shown success on the merits of its
claims, whether the plaintiff would be injured without the injunctive
relief, whether the harm to the plaintiff would be greater than the harm
of an injunction on the defendant and whether the injunction would not
unfavorably affect the public interest. 199 The court held that an
injunction was necessary because the plaintiffs proved that the Act was
unconstitutional, and the injunction would further the public interest in
protecting the health of pregnant minors.2 0 Planned Parenthood of
Northem New England v. Peter Heed, No. CIV 03-491-JD, 2003 WL
23025210 (NH Dec. 29, 2003).
TORTS
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Is Cause of Action
Recoverable Under Texas Survival Statute
The Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District held intentional
infliction of emotional distress to be a cause of action recoverable
under the Texas Survival Statute.
'93 d. at *4-5.
"'PlannedParenthoodofNorthern New England,2003 WL 23025210 at *4-5.
"'Id.at 4-5.
'1d. at *5.
'7. at *6.
198d

2'"Id

at *7.

0"PlannedParenthoodof Northern New England,2003 WL 23025210 at *7.

20

' Cortez v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., No. 04-02-00536-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 18,
*12 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).
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Plaintiff brought suit in 1995 for negligence, gross negligence and
intentional
infliction
distress against Defendant nursing
home
one
and f i of
s emotional
"
202
home and one of its employees.
Plaintiff brought a claim for
negligence against the Defendants after she was injured while
20 3
attempting to transfer herself from her commode to her wheelchair.
While suit was pending, Plaintiff passed away. 2°4 As a result of
Plaintiff's death, the district court granted a directed verdict on the
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff's
representative appealed the ruling.0 6
Plaintiff s appeal created an issue of first impression for the Court
of Appeals of Texas. 20 7 Defendants argued that Plaintiff's claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress did not survive her death,
however, the Texas Survival Statute was enacted to continue a
decedent's cause of action beyond death.20 8 The issue before the court
was whether a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was
a cause of action recoverable under the statute, which only addressed
torts related to injury of the body, reputation or health.3 9
In making its decision on the issue at bar, the court looked at how
a claim for mental anguish was treated under the statute.210 Similar to
intentional infliction of emotional distress in that it does not require
proof of physical injury, mental anguish was previously determined to
be a claim recoverable under the statute.2 ' Therefore, the court held
that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress survives a
claimant's death.212
Based on this holding, the court reversed the district court's
directed verdict against Defendant employee.2 3 However, the court
upheld the directed verdict against Defendant nursing home because the
jury found that Defendant employee, who was the alleged perpetrator
of the infliction of the emotional distress, was not working within the
scope of his employment at the time of the injury to Plaintiff.214 Cortez
v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., No. 04-02-00536-CV, 2004 Tex. App.
LEXIS 18, (Tex. Ct.App. 2004).
2
.Idat
23
1d at
204
id.
20 5

* 1.
*2.

Id. at *9.

2

11Conez, 2004
27
° 1d at *10.
2°1Id at *9-11.
29
' 1d. at *10-11.
2

Tex. App. LEXIS 18 at *9.

'1d at *11.

2

"'Cortez,2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 18 at *12.

2

12id.

2"3d at *16.
21 4
1d at *17.
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EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
No Title VII Action Exists When an Employee Refuses
Reasonable Employer Request
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of a New York
hospital because the actions of the employee filing the claim were
severe enough to justify termination without unemployment benefits.215
Pro se plaintiff, Marie Pointdujour, alleged she was sexually
harassed by a supervising nurse manager at Mount Sinai Hospital.216
iclaimed
Plaintifftold
the harassment
medi
er te
•
211 occurred for six months before she
told her immediate supervisor.
On the day she informed him, she
2
requested a meeting with the staff. The meeting was held about five
minutes later in an area near a patient waiting room. 9 Ms. Pointdujour
launched into an odd monologue where she stated her lack of interest in
being a lesbian, and that she was content with womanhood and to
please stop harassing her.220 The day after the meeting she was given a
Warning Notice by a union representative. ~211It alleged that Ms.
Pointdujour violated hospital rules. 2 The alleged harasser asked Ms.
Pointdujour to seek help from the Employee Assistance Program
(EAP).223 When she refused, she was suspended pending further
investigation.224 The Labor Relations Manager at Mount Sinai offered
Ms. Pointdujour the options of (1) either being reinstated if she went to
the EAP and received a fitness for duty report or (2) resign for personal
reasons. 221 When she continuously refused, she was fired. 2
The appellate court explained that to analyze claims of retaliation,
the Title VII framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
22721
is useful..
It states a prima facie case of retaliation must be shown. 8
26

...Pointdujour v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 02 Civ. 4470, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 629, at *14
(N.Y. App.
Div 2004).
216
Id. at *1.
217

Id at *3.
"Id at *4.

219id

22

Pointdujour,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 629, at *5.

12ld

at *6.

2221d

2

3

Id. at *7.

2241Id.

2

Poiutdujotr 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 629, at *8.
221d. at *8.
22Id at *10.
2281d.
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To show a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show: (1) that she
engaged in protected participation or opposition under Title VII; (2) the
employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employer took adverse
action against the plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection exists between
the protected activity and the adverse action. 229 The court granted
plaintiff the showing, acknowledging it was a bit tenuated.23 ° Once the
prima facie case is made, an employer must show "evidence of a
legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the challenged employment
decision., 231 Finally, if the employer does this, the plaintiff must
"point to evidence that would be sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to conclude that the employer's
explanation is merely a pretext
232
for impermissible retaliation.
The question before the court was whether the employee's
independent conduct provided legitimate reasons aside from retaliation
for her firing. 233 The employer cited many instances in which the
employee had been reprimanded and complaints of harassment filed
against her.234 The court was most persuaded by the employee's refusal

to seek assistance from the EAP. 35
The court stated that even with the evidence construed most
favorably to the employee, her continuous refusal to obey a reasonable
request was the reason she was fired. 236 Based on this, the court granted
summary judgment stating that plaintiff failed to submit "evidence that
would permit a rational fact finder to conclude that the employer's
explanation is merely a pretext for retaliation." 37 Pointdujour v. Mt.
Sinai Hospital, No. 02 Civ. 4470, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 629 (N.Y
App. Div. 2004).
ERISA
ERISA Preemption of State Based Claims Requires Relevant State
Law Address Areas of Exclusively Federal Concern or Directly
Affect the Relationship Among the Traditional ERISA Entities
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
Dallas Division, in ruling:upon a motion for remand to state court and
229

1d

23
23 1

Pointdujour,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 629, at * 11.
Id

232

1d

231Id. at

*12.

234id.
235
Pointdujour,2004
236

1d at * 14.

2371d

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 629, at * 12.
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corresponding attorney's fees, held federal subject matter jurisdiction
did not exist where a third-party provider's claim was brought
independently and based in state contract law; however, removal of the
cause was conceivable, so costs and fees were denied. 38
Baylor University Medical Center (Baylor) entered into a contract
with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas (BCBSTX).239 The contract
became effective on January 1, 1998, and provided Baylor would
furnish discounted medical services to those insured under a BCBSTX
plan, as well as those covered under any out-of-state Blue Cross Blue
Shield Plan. 240 As provided for under the contract, Baylor provided
discounted services to an enrollee of the Arkansas Blue Cross Blue
Shield (ABCBS) plan, and submitted a "clean claim" to ABCBS for
services rendered. 241
Baylor brought the suit underlying this motion when ABCBS
2 42
failed to pay a portion of the charges under the "clean claim.
Baylor alleged ABCBS violated the contractual agreement by paying
only a portion of the discounted charges due. 243 Baylor also alleged, in
accordance with the Texas Insurance Code, ABCBS was liable for the
full-billed charges as payment was over 45 days late. 244 ABCBS timely
removed this action asserting Baylor's claims are preempted under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 45 Baylor
filed this motion for remand to state court, alleging improper removal,
and sought award of attorney's fees.246
The court explained removal is only proper where the plaintiff's
only potential remedies exist in federal court. 7 The court went on to
assert that state-law claims seeking remedies under ERISA are to be
characterized as claims under federal law.
The court explained
ERISA preemption of state law claims is only proper "where the state
law addresses areas of exclusively federal concern," or "where the
state law directly affects the relationship among the traditional ERISA
entities." 24'9 The court determined Baylor's efforts to enforce its
contractual right to payment does not constitute an area of exclusive
24

..8Baylor University Medical Center v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 3:03-CV2084-G, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 278 at *26-27 (N.D. Tex. January 9, 2004).
139Id at *2.
241d. at *2-3.
242id

243
2 Baylor,2004

"Id

141d

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 278 at *3.

at *4.

241d at *5.
248

Baylor,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 278 at *6.
24914 at *10-13.
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federal concern. 2' ° Furthermore, the court emphasized Baylor's cause
of action arose independently under state law, and was not the result of
the enrollee having assigned their right to recover to Baylor.
Therefore, Baylor's cause of action arose exclusively from state
contract law, rather than under the provisions of ERISA.252
The court determined Baylor's statutory claim, derived from the
Texas Insurance Code, was based upon a state law promoting timely
payment by insurers to providers, which is only "tenuously, remotely,
or peripherally" related to ERISA. 25 ' Therefore, the court concluded
the relationship between the traditional ERISA entities was not directly
affected by Baylor's statutory claim.254 Based upon the foregoing,
Baylor's motion for remand to state court was granted. 25 ' However, as
removal was conceivable and ABCBS presented sound arguments, the
court denied Baylor's requests for costs and attorney's fees."' Baylor
University Medical Center v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield, No.
3.03-CV-2084-G, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 278 (N.D. Tex. January 9,
2004).
MENTAL HEALTH AND EMPLOYMENT
Employer Had Probable Cause to Have Employee Involuntarily
Committed and Employer Was Protected By Qualified Immunity
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
granted summary judgment on federal claims and declined to exercise
its supplemental jurisdictions over state claims when defendant
Hoffman Estates Police Department (Hoffmann Estates) involuntary
committed its employee Gerald Chapala (Chapala).257 Chapala sued
Hoffman Estates Police Department (Hoffman Estates) for alleged
violations of his fourth and fourteenth amendment rights and state law
claims.5
On September 24, 2001, Officer Chapala encountered Officer
Caceres in the locker room where Caceres taunted him repeatedly by

2

.Id at* 15.
"'Id.at *16-18.
21'Id at * 16.
153Baylor,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 278 at *24.
"4d
at *25.
"lid
at *27.
25
6
1d at *26-27.
2
15Chapala v. Hoffman Estates Police Dept., No. 02 C 3056, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110
at *1 (N.D.
IL January 7, 2004).
258id
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saying "Gerry, Gerry, your shotgun is talking to you. 259 Caceres left
and approached Lieutenant Hish stating that Chapala attacked him
without provocation, making statements like "the end is near" and "the
Giant is coming. 260 The next day, Hoffman Estates placed Chapala on
paid administrative leave pending his completion of a fitness for duty
evaluation. 261 When Chapala entered Hoffman Estates, it was requested
he surrender his off-duty weapon because the Chief of Police
(Herdegen) wanted to speak with him regarding the incident.
However, Chapala had concealed an unauthorized high-powered, 9mm,
semi-automatic pistol in his waistband, which he did not report or
surrender at the time. 26' Herdegan told Chapala that an investigation of
the previous night's incident was taking place and that he would be
placed on administrative leave and required to complete a hospital
evaluation. 264 Chapala agreed to go to the hospital, but only after
Herdegan informed him that he would be disciplined if he refused.265
Chapala, Herdegan, and another officer went to the hospital
together, and Chapala surrendered his concealed weapon.
The
caseworker who interviewed Chapala told Herdegan that Chapala
should be signed into the hospital.266 Herdegan signed the petition after
hearing that Chapala left a backpack containing five magazines, each
with a thirty-round capacity, and 145 rounds of bullets left in a
Hoffman Estate's office. 267 The physician who examined Chapala
concluded that Chapala was mentally ill and in danger of harming
himself and others.268 Chapala was committed that day.269

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record as a
whole establishes that no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving
party. 27 ° The court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction
over Chapala's state claims. 27' The court granted summary judgment on
the fourteenth amendment claim because it needed to be analyzed
under the fourth amendment standard.272 In analyzing the fourth
amendment claims against Hoffman Estates, the court then granted
259

Id. at *2.

26o
id
61

1

d at *2-3.

6

1 1Chapala,

26 3

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110 at *3.

1d.

64Id. at
161Id.

2

66Id

*3-4.
at *4.

267id
167Chapala,

26Id. at *6.
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Id
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d at *13.
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summary judgment because Chapala failed to show that the deprivation
of his constitutional right was pursuant to a policy, custom or practice
of Hoffman Estate.273

In analyzing Chapala's fourth amendment claims against
individual defendants, the court granted summary judgment because
defendants had probable cause to believe that Chapala was mentally ill
and was a danger to himself and others when committed.274 In addition,
if defendants did not have probable cause, they would still be shielded
from Chapala's fourth amendment claims by qualified immunity.275
Summary judgment motion was granted for the fourth and fourteenth
amendment claims.2 76 The state-law claims were dismissed without
prejudice.277 Chapala v. Hoffman Estates Police Dept., No. 02 C 3056,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110 (N.D. IL January 7, 2004).
ZONING
Spacing Ordinance Granted to Permanent Homeless/Disabled
Housing Facility as a Reasonable and Necessary Accommodation
Under Fair Housing Amendment Act
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed the trial court's holding
that a spacing ordinance was a reasonable and
necessary
278
Act.
Amendment
Housing
Fair
the
under
accommodation
In 2001, Respondent, Plymouth Neighborhood Church Foundation
(Foundation) purchased an abandoned nursing home at 1920 LaSalle
Avenue, which it intended to convert into permanent housing for
homeless individuals disabled by mental illness, chemical dependency,
or HIV/AIDS. 279 Due to certain zoning ordinances, the Foundation
filed an application for a conditional use permit, a maximum
occupancy variance and a spacing ordinance waiver. 2' ° A neighborhood
task force determined the permanent housing complex (Lydia House)
would have a detrimental impact and submitted a report to the city
planning department requesting the permit and variance be denied.281
After reviewing the Foundation's application, the city planning
T'd at *9.
11d. at *11.
.751d. at *12.
21d. at *14.
277
Chapala,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110 at *14.
2
.Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, *13
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
...
1d.at 16-17.
Mom at *17.
27

281md

2004]
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department's report, and holding public hearings, the city planning
commission granted the spacing ordinance waiver as a reasonable and
282
necessary accommodation under the Fair Housing Amendment Act.
Additionally, the planning commission granted the conditional use
permit as well as the maximum occupancy variance.
Citizens
appealed the decision to the Minneapolis City Council, which
concluded the Fair Housing Amendment Act mandated the spacing
ordinance waiver be granted.284 Citizens appealed to the Hennepin
County District Court, and the district court granted Foundation's
motion for summary judgment.8
On appeal, the appellate court looked to Oconomonoc Residential
Programs,Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, which held an accommodation
reasonable under the Fair Housing Amendment Act if it is "capable of
producing desirable results and [does] not impose undue financial or
administrative burdens. 286 The court held an accommodation is
necessary if it is needed to grant disabled people equal opportunity to
live in a certain neighborhood as people without disabilities. 287 The
court further concluded the requirements under the Fair Housing
Amendment Act constituted a legally sufficient basis to grant a
waiver. 288
The court reviewed the city counsel's findings of fact and
concluded the waiver was reasonable and necessary because it would
not impose a financial or administrative burden on the city and Lydia
House would not alter the city's land use or zoning scheme. 89
The court rejected Citizen's arguments that the grant of the
conditional use permit was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable based
on the evidence presented that Lydia House would be detrimental to the
health, safety, and welfare of the general public.290 The court held
denial of conditional use requires something more than public
opposition and concerns for general welfare. 9' It further held that
approval of permit use follows as a "matter of right" once the formal
requirements have been met.2 92 Citizens for a Balanced City v.
282

id

283

Citizens for a Balanced City, 672 N.W.2d 13 at *17.

'mmd at* 17-18.
85

. Id at * 18.
...
Id.at *20 citing Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 300
F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir. 2002).
211Citizens for a Balanced City, 672 N.w.2d 13 at
*21.
288

1d.

2'oI at *23.
29

2d.
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Balanced City,672 N.W.2d 13 at *23.
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Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N. W.2d 13 (Minn. Ct. App.
2003).

